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Abstract 
This work focuses on the role of indicators in technology innovation decisions in three knowledge-
intensive groups: researchers in public institutions, leaders in research & development in industry and 
policy makers. The work presents quantitative results obtained from three questionnaires sent to these 
groups in Portugal. 
The study suggests that indicators are instruments of technology innovation decision but their 
influence dependents on social context and the types of decisions. Results show that indicators were 
used by all groups, but were not significantly influential in technology innovation decisions. The 
group of researchers were more influenced by indicators than by their social relations, revealing a 
balance between an instrumental use, a symbolic use and no use at all of indicators. The group focused 
their decisions on the acquisition of products/technology, and identified its main influences in 
knowledge sources and users. The majority of the business and policy makers revealed that indicators 
were mostly used in a symbolic way, and were more influenced by social relations than by indicators. 
The business group focused its decision on the development of products/technology, and declared 
stronger influences from hierarchies and users in its decisions. The policy makers focused their 
decisions on the design of innovation policies, and were also stronger influenced by hierarchies and 
knowledge sources.  
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1. Introduction 
There has been an increase in the production of quantified measures in most societies in the last 
century.1 The use of these measures can be observed in different human efforts, such as in companies, 
administration of states, military works, scientific production, etc. (Porter 1995). There is a 
generalized consensus that these quantification efforts produce indicators useful to make coherent and 
enhanced human decisions. However, although considered a useful instrument to guide and improve 
decisions, indicators received comparatively less attention from researchers in understanding their 
relevance in decision-making. In policy contexts, a few studies revealed that they were ignored and 
limited.2 In innovation contexts, only a few works have provided evidences of their concrete use and 
influence in decisions.3This paper reveals that, although indicators are described as instruments for 
decision, their final influence in knowledge-intensive contexts is significantly dependent of the social 
context and the type of decision. 
The paper addresses in a quantitative way the question on how knowledge-intensive groups involved 
in technology innovation make their decisions. It seeks to understand the possible discrepancy 
between the consensus about the usefulness of indicators, and the reality of their use and influence in a 
knowledge context. The work focuses on knowledge-intensive groups because they are the most prone 
to use quantified measures in their work. In fact, knowledge-intensive groups can use these measures 
more than other groups because, in their work, they have a facilitated access to knowledge, 
information and indicators. The paper studied the behaviour of knowledge-intensive groups that 
engaged in decisions related technology innovation, because these types of decisions were concrete, 
identifiable, knowledge-dependent and relevant from a socio-economic perspective. Three groups 
were analysed, namely: (1) a researchers group composed of public researchers, academics, and 
Research and Development (R&D) health personnel; (2) a business group composed by companies’ 
Research, Development and Innovation (R&D&I) personnel;4 and (3) policy makers related to 
technology innovation. The research combined literature research, analysis of official documents, 
three questionnaires and interviews and is located in Portugal. 
The work is divided in four parts: The first section discusses the influence of indicators under the 
context of technology innovation decisions. The second section describes the methodology used in the 
work, focusing in more detail on the construction of the samples. The third section presents 
                                                   
1See, for example, the prolific data-gathering work about the world economy of Angus Maddison (Maddison 
2001; Maddison 2006). 
2See Porter (1995); Gudmundsson and Sørensen (2012); C. Freeman (1995); Power (1997); Grupp and Schubert 
(2010); Grupp and Mogee (2004). 
3See Gudmundsson and Sørensen (2012); Fioramonti (2014); Boavida, Moniz, and Manuel Laranja (2013). 
4In order to simplify the presentation of the data, researchers group will be briefly denominated as researchers, 
and the group of business R&D&I personnel is briefly denominated “business” or “companies”. 
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quantitative results regarding whether indicators were used and the influence they had in technology 
decisions. It starts by distinguishing in a quantitative way the use from the real influence of indicators, 
analysing afterwards the influence of the social context and the type of technology decision. The last 
part discusses the conclusions presented in the former chapter, and elaborates on the next lines of 
research for this topic.  
2. Technology innovation decisions and indicators 
This part introduces the framework to study the presence of indicators in technology innovation 
contexts. After identifying the main knowledge gaps existent in the literature, it will be argued that the 
study needs to distinguish between the use from the real influence of indicators, to detect contextual 
influences and to identify the types of technology decision involved. 
2.1 Decisions in innovation contexts 
An innovation is commonly defined as a new idea, device or method. The result of an innovation is 
normally a technological product/service or the significant improvement of a product or a process. 
According to Utterback (1974), innovation is distinct from an invention or technical prototype, and 
refers to technology actually being used or applied for the first time. Innovation processes can be 
defined as a set of inventions and implementation of new ideas, which are developed by people, who 
engage in transactions with others over time within an institutional context, and who judge outcomes 
of their efforts and act accordingly (Van de Ven and Poole 1990). In addition, there are several types 
of innovations such as product, process, marketing and organization innovation. This work will focus 
only on technology innovations, which can include innovative products and processes. Technology 
innovation requires a previous technology decision easily identifiable determinant for its sucess, such 
as acquiring or developing products/technologies, buying intellectual property rights or designing 
innovation policies. 
Decision making models are conceptual frameworks for understanding how decision makers process 
information and arrive at conclusions (Harren 1979). They can be defined as a simplified description 
of a psychological process in which one organizes information, deliberates among alternatives and 
makes a commitment to a course of action (Harren). Although there is not a model for technology 
decision, there is a significant number of different dimensions and models of general decision making 
in the scientific literature (see among others Scott and Bruce 1995; Hunt et al. 1989; Harren 1979; 
Swami 2013). Decision making is a multidisciplinary topic that spans across many disciplines such as 
philosophy, psychology, management, economics, engineering or mathematics, among others. It is 
therefore not surprising that most dimensions of the models are bounded to the fields/disciplines of 
research of the authors, such as health (Smith, Higgs, and Ellis 2008; Murray et al. 2007), education 
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(Galotti et al. 2006; Harren 1979), military (Thunholm 2004; Scott and Bruce 1995), psychology 
(Curseu and Schruijer 2012; Schwartz et al. 2002; Starcke and Brand 2012), economics (Simon 1959; 
Simon 1979; Menzel 2013), business (Jauch and Glueck 1988; Swami 2013; Schoemaker and Russo 
1993; Sull and Eisenhardt 2012), etc.  
Given the lack of a specific technology decision model, it is convenient to observe similar examples 
developed to frame decisions. In one example of an organizational study of decision making models 
with senior managers, Turpin and Marais (2004) described nine existing approaches to decision 
making: 1) rational, 2) bounded rationality, 3) incrementalist view, 4) organizational procedures view, 
5) political view, 6) garbage-can model, 7) individual differences perspective, 8) naturalistic decision-
making and 9) multiple perspective approach. Other studies were less abundant in the number of 
possible ways to decide. For example, in a military-oriented study Peter Thunholm (2004) reported on 
five decision making styles (independent not mutually exclusive): 1) rational, 2) intuitive, 3) 
dependent, 4) avoidant and 5) spontaneous.5 However, Thunholm supported the view that although the 
rational and intuitive styles were unproblematic from a theoretical point of view, the intellectual 
foundations of the other styles were unclear. For example, his spontaneous style “might perhaps be 
viewed as a kind of high-speed intuitive decision making style” (934). Furthermore, the literature 
reveals that most models of decision propose, at least, a rational-analytic reasoning and an emotional-
intuitive approach to explain the major considerations dominating the attention of an individual during 
the decision. Therefore, given the variety of approaches that can be considered in a decision model, 
there is a strong case to use a rational-analytic reasoning and an emotional-intuitive approach. 
Several authors have argued, furthermore, about the existence of a third political-behavioural approach 
in the model in order to account for the impact of different stakeholders6 in the decision process (see 
for example Linn, Man, and Bossink 2013; Jauch and Glueck 1988; Ilori and Irefin 1997; Dill 1975; 
Gray and Ariss 1985; Narayanan and Fahey 1982). According to Cray et al. (1991), political processes 
normally hidden are brought to the fore in strategic decisions that carry high stakes for those involved, 
affect the organizations in which decisions are taken and/or might have potential effects for large 
segments of society. To these authors the political aspect of decision making is very important, 
because a “bad” decision can be costly. In fact, an erroneous decision can cost a manager researcher or 
a politician his/her credibility, promotion, bonuses or even her/his job; backing a wrong alternative can 
cost a department/political faction its political future; and a serious error can accelerate the death of an 
organization, a department and even a political faction. 
                                                   
5The Swedish General Decision-making Style (GDMS) inventory was created based on a (Scott and Bruce 1995) 
work, and validated with 1441 male military officers on career decision making and, later, with samples of 
students, engineers and technician on important decisions in general. 
6The term stakeholders is here referred sensu lato as defined by Freeman and Reed (1983) which includes 
shareowners, employees, customers, suppliers, lenders and society. 
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In this work there is the need to find a decision model entailing three main requirements related to 
innovation. First, the model should be adequate to where most innovations occur: the business 
environment and the public research organizational setting. It has therefore to be coherent with the 
ways business innovators make decisions as well as public researchers. Second, innovation processes 
need to be analysed within a model that is compatible at all levels to the interactions between the three 
main actors: researchers, business innovators and in particular policy makers. The model should also 
be able to accommodate the way interactions between these actors occur at different levels: in the 
larger landscape context of socio-technical transitions, at the regime level where governments and 
policy makers play a decisive role, and at the firm level where individuals and organizations are 
determinant to innovation. Third and last, the model has to be able to encompass the strategic 
dimension of innovation to researchers (or inventors), firms, governments and society at large. 
According to Nutt and Wilson (2010), the term strategic decision making is often used to indicate 
important or key decisions made in organizations of all types. In this work the emphasis is on studying 
the decision making of a significant technology decision occurred in an innovation context. 
Technology innovation decisions are directly associated with new innovations, which emphasises the 
strategic nature of these decisions occurring in a firm or a research lab or an innovation policy.  
Taking these aspects into consideration, it can be concluded that a possible suggestion of a model for 
technology decision would need to be based on strategic decision making and include not only a 
rational and emotional approach, but also a political one. In their strategic management studies, Jauch 
and Glueck (1988) framed three major decision making approaches rational, emotional and political. 
However, literature review suggests an adaptation to more specific labels for the styles that capture in 
detail these types of decision: 1) rational-analytical, 2) emotional-intuitive and 3) political-
behavioural. The following figure captures the components of three possible strategic decision 
processes: 
 
Source: Adaptation from Jauch and Glueck (1988:23) 
Figure 1 – Components of strategic decision making processes 
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 The rational-analytical approach (1) to decision is based on the use of quantitative methods. The 
decision is the choice the actor makes in full awareness of all available and feasible alternatives, to 
maximize advantages (Jauch and Glueck 1988). In complex cases, it requires a close collaboration 
between the analysts and other potential users of the decision. It prescribes a rational, conscious, 
systematic and analytical approach.  
According to Dean and Sharfman (1993), rationality is the extent to which the decision-making 
process reflects a desire to make the best decision possible under the circumstances. To these 
authors this intended rationality (or procedural rationality) is characterized by an attempt to collect 
the information necessary to form expectations about various alternatives, and the use of this 
information in the final decision. Therefore, it can be defined that rationality in strategic decision 
is the degree of involvement in collection of information relevant to the decision, and the reliance 
upon analysis of this information in making the choice. Furthermore, Kuhlmann, Shapira, and 
Smits (2010) supported the view that intended rationality will remain the innovation actors’ 
prevailing mode of guidance for learning and changing of perspectives. Indicators are instruments 
that can reveal the rational-analytical thinking dominating the individual’s attention during the 
decision. 
Jauch and Glueck (1988) pointed out that there are three major criticisms to this theoretical 
approach: (a) the decision maker is not alone and is often a part of a multiparty decision situation; 
(b) decision makers are not rational enough, informed well enough or information can be too 
costly to consider all alternatives and consequences of the decision; and (c) decision makers have 
more goals than just the maximization of objectives. For example, they can be simply aiming to 
suffice their decision instead of finding the optimal solution. It should also be stressed that the 
objectives might change, which may also undermine the optimal solution. 
 The emotional-intuitive approach (2) in decision making is based on the habit or experience, gut 
feeling and instinct, and is guided by unconscious mental processes (Jauch and Glueck 1988). 
Many judgements are made by emotional-intuitive decision makers considering a number of 
alternatives and options. In fact, most decision makers prefer judgements that may lead to a better 
decision than analytical techniques. This is because judgments can include other factors or timings 
(not included in rational-analytical model) that lead to a better overall decision than simply 
holding what a quantitative model prescribes (Ilori and Irefin 1997). 
This model has been criticised because: (a) it does not effectively use all tools available to decide; 
and (b) a rational model ensures that proper attention is given to consequences of decisions before 
significant mistakes are made (Jauch and Glueck 1988).7 Furthermore, (c) there is a lack of 
scientific consensus to what intuition exactly means,8 which partially explains the option to name 
                                                   
7In this emotional-intuitive model, the use of indicators is rather limited because it is normally based on 
qualitative methods. 
8 Some researchers consider the scientific study of intuition impossible, seen as an esoteric phenomenon or just 
erratic nonsense. However, Schoemaker and Russo (1993) considered that intuition can be brilliant when based 
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this approach as emotional-intuitive rather than the authors’ intuitive-emotional. Other authors 
used only an emotional approach, which excludes an enriching part of the concept of intuition.9 
 The political-behavioural approach (3) in decision making highlights the pressure of different 
stakeholders and their impact in the decision process. Stakeholders during a decision can be 
suppliers, trade unions, owners, workers, government, other institutions (parliaments, committees, 
agencies, etc.), competitors, colleagues, experts, etc. The political-behavioural approach implies 
that there is a limited number of choices available, determined by the organization and 
institutional arrangements. In this approach decisions are made when several stakeholders agree 
that a solution was found, through adjustments and negotiations. This approach considers that the 
real decision makers must consider a variety of pressures from other people affected by their 
decisions and reflect whether the decision can be implemented politically (Narayanan and Fahey 
1982; Ilori and Irefin 1997; Jauch and Glueck 1988). In fact, an organization has to interact with a 
variety of stakeholders holding different amounts of power that give an individual or an 
organization something and expects something in return. Naturally, the more power stakeholders 
have the more influence they will exert over decisions, because organizations are more dependent 
on them (Jauch and Glueck 1988). Therefore, decision makers meet stakeholders’ demands 
through political compromise, by mutual adjustments and merging competing demands to create a 
coalition of interests that will support the decision.  
Decisions are made in a process of mutual influence that may involve actors with different, 
sometimes even opposing interests. In fact, strategic decisions are often made in a social process 
of interaction of different actors and groups of actors. In this train of thought, some authors 
stressed that, in reality, when decisions are made it is the product of social relations that matters, 
such as networking activities, different forms of social pressure, expression of values and norms, 
etc. According to Perri 6 (2002), decision makers use only a certain amount of knowledge when 
making a decision, and their judgments are rather dependent on where actors are socially situated 
and integrated. Perri supports the view that forces of social regulation and social integration exist 
and shape the individuals’ decisions. These forces can be used to explain how several social actors 
use information, behave and judge. The product of social relations acts upon individuals, both 
                                                                                                                                                               
on extensive learning from past experience, probably reflecting an automated expertise. In fact, the current 
technical conception of intuition implies that it arises from knowledge and experience. It also implies that 
intuition involves a form of information processing that might be more implicit than explicit, but which is not at 
all irrational. 
9According to Emma Policastro (1999) intuition may be defined as a tacit form of knowledge that guides 
decision making in a promising direction, which in the context of innovation leads to potentially creative results. 
Intuition is assumed to be especially important in tasks with high complexity, short time horizons, ill structured 
problems and involving moral evaluations (Linn, Man, and Bossink (2013). It involves the ability to quickly 
synthesize, integrate information and use of decision makers’ experience. To Policastro intuition seems to be 
most useful when there are high stakes, a high level of uncertainty, and pressure to make the right decision in a 
limited amount of time. In her perspective intuitions are not infallible, since they are like rough estimates, which 
necessarily entail some margin of error. In addition, research showed that there is not much knowledge about 
how intuition works, under which circumstances it may or may not be useful, or how to reduce its margin of 
error. 
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consciously and unconsciously, constraining and guiding them throughout their decision making. 
Therefore, the term social relations is here used broadly to refer to the multiple ways people are 
connected and influence one another (Hall and Lamont 2013). The term relates to all social 
activities that can influence a technology decision such as networking activities, hierarchical or 
peer pressures, marketing activities, values and norms, etc.  
This approach has been criticized for implying that institutions play a real role in limiting the 
choices available to a decision maker. The approach implies that decision makers accept and 
recognize the power of stakeholders. However, decision makers might be pretending to negotiate, 
and will not accept mutual adjustments and real negotiations. Furthermore, the approach 
unrealistically implies that all decision makers previously considered whether the decision 
outcome might be implemented politically. 
In figure 1 the possible interactions between the three different approaches are identified, since the 
three processes can occur in parallel. The rational-analytic and political-behavioural approaches can 
interact (4). In fact, a decision process can be simultaneously high/low in politics and high/low in 
rationality, because in some cases it can be rational to behave politically or political to behave 
rationally (Linn, Man, and Bossink 2013; Dean and Sharfman 1993). Furthermore, politics may 
frequently obstruct the flow of information, particularly at high-velocity environments where timely 
and accurate information is only shared amongst selected members of the group (Eisenhardt and 
Bourgeois 1988; Perri 6 2002). Therefore, political behaviour may hinder the rational assessment of a 
situation, since decision makers cannot consider the whole range of different alternatives (Linn, Man, 
and Bossink 2013). It is important to stress, however, that to the best of the available knowledge, the 
scientific literature does not provide sufficient empirical evidences regarding the other interrelations 
that can exist and are identified in figure 1. First, the depicted interaction (5) between rational-analytic 
and emotional-intuitive approaches is based on assumptions by researchers in the literature, who failed 
to provide rigorous empirical data, according to a review made by Linn, Man, and Bossink (2013). 
The interaction (6) between political behaviour and emotional-intuitive approaches are not known and 
according Linn, Man, and Bossink there are no empirical studies about this interrelation. Last, Linn, 
Man, and Bossink (2013) found that a process dominated by rationality and supported by intuition 
yield more effective political processes (7). However, the authors failed to back up their findings 
convincingly, which renders the interaction between the three approaches unconfirmed. 
In sum, an analysis of the decision making literature reveals that most models of decision making 
propose at least a rational-analytic reasoning, and an emotional-intuitive approach to explain the main 
considerations dominating the attention of an individual during the decision. The proposed model to 
technology decision includes also a political-behavioural approach mostly because these decisions can 
also be understood as strategic decisions in innovation processes. The decision to use a predominant 
approach can be acknowledged through an inquire about the influence of indicators. With the 
 8 
exception of the interaction between rational-analytic and political-behaviour approaches, the 
remaining interactions between approaches to decisions are not well understood. 
2.2 The rise of indicators 
An indicator can be defined as a numerical sign that shows what something is like or how a situation is 
changing. This specific sign of a phenomenon under study is commonly, though disputably,10 defined 
within the boundaries of classic scientific disciplines, and assumed to be a scientifically objective 
measure beyond debate and a proxy of scientific knowledge. This work deals with indicators just as a 
quantified instruments available to help people decide about technology in innovation contexts, such 
as costs, technical characteristics, market share, R&D expenditures, carbon emissions, size of vehicles 
fleet, etc.  
Indicators exist as a human effort to simplify the governance of the realm. They are inherently 
connected with the social need of quantification for public as well as for scientific purposes. Theodore 
Porter (1995, 74) argued that these quantification efforts were generally allied with the raise of the 
“spirit of rigor”. According to the author: 
Strict quantification, through measurement, counting, and calculation, is among the most 
credible strategies for rendering nature or society objective. It has enjoyed widespread and 
growing authority in Europe and America for about two centuries. In natural science its reign 
began still earlier. It has also been strenuously opposed. This ideal of objectivity is a political 
as well as a scientific one. Objectivity means the rule of law, not of men. It implies the 
subordination of personal interests and prejudices to public standards. (Porter 1995, 75) 
The origins of indicators as modes of knowledge and governance can be traced back to the practices of 
business management at least since the fourteenth century, where quantification needs were crucial to 
conduct the Venetian trade with Cyprus (Maddison 2006). Later, the rise of the scientific mentality 
played an important role, since it included an insistence on objectivity, on the written word, on 
rigorous quantification, on transparency, etc. (Porter 1995). Furthermore, the creation of indicators is 
also associated with the need for governance, originated in the seventeenth century, when “the art of 
reasoning by figures on things relating to government” was called Political Arithmetic (Maddison 
2001). After, indicators were used in connection with the raise of the modern nation-states in the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, and their need to govern objectively, impartially and transparently 
(Merry 2011). Most of the initial demands for indicators came from the need of engineers and 
technocrats enrolled in the development of an administrative culture in modern France, highly 
                                                   
10In fact, although commonly accepted, debates continue about the object measured by indicators such as non-
R&D innovation expenditure, SMEs introducing marketing/organisational innovations, innovative SMEs 
collaborating with others, etc.), as well as the nature of reality being measured. Furthermore, an indicator claims 
to objectivity has to be restrained to “knowledge produced in conformity with the prevailing standards of 
scientific practice as determined by the current judgements of the scientific community” in (Porter 1995, 216). 
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interested in management with considerable enthusiasm for the work on efficiency of Frederick 
Winslow Taylor, among others (Porter 1995). 
In the 1930s a significant impulse to quantification was given with the growth of science in the USA 
and the culture of equidistance and impersonal objectivity in decision making. In America, important 
efforts of quantification were implemented with the systematic use of Intelligence Quotient11 tests to 
classify students, opinion polls to quantify the public mood, elaborate statistical methodologies for 
licensing drugs, and even cost-benefit and risk analysis to assess public works (Porter 1995). Later in 
the 1950s, a significant stimulus was given to the need of objectivity and quantification with the US 
Corps of Engineers. The US Corps began concentrating their “failed engineers” in economic efforts 
around all district offices “where they were likely to do less harm” (186). At the same time, the US 
Corps began employing increasing numbers of economists and other social scientists that produced a 
takeover of economists and the emergence of cost-benefit analysis in modern economic studies. This 
type of analysis began with water projects and transport studies, but were later significantly 
disseminated with RAND’s12 military studies. Furthermore, Power (1997) and Porter (1995) suggested 
that accountants and the rise of bureaucracy played also a significant role in the rise of quantification 
in most aspects of life, particularly during the twentieth century. 
In the 1970s a "social movement of indicators" was born in reaction to the economic orientation of the 
above-mentioned quantification culture. These group of intellectuals, mostly social scientists, 
considered that the word “social” was restrictively defined and meant only “outside the realm of 
economics” (Sheldon and Parke 1975, 695). To them, science (or quantification) created a new sort of 
“philistines” encouraged by the relative ease of expressing quantities in dollars and, consequently, 
given an exaggerated importance in the interpretation of the realm (695). Therefore, these scientists 
argued for a change in conceptual frameworks, shifting the emphasis from economics to measures of 
social change, which included different subsystems in society like education, health, economics, etc. 
The arguments were centred on the controversy that resulted from an economic centred perspective, 
and mainly focused on what this new wave of indicators should measure.  
The controversy eventually faded-out and the quantification rationale started to be applied to all parts 
of life, broadening its scope to almost every area of knowledge or human endeavour. Today, we can 
find this quantification rationale applied to global scales (Misuraca, Codagnone, and Rossel 2013; 
Maddison 2006) and even in our personal lives. For example, Robichaud, Durand, and Ouellet (2006) 
reported on the existence of indicators for personal quality of life, such as measures of verbal 
                                                   
11Intelligence Quotient, commonly known as IQ, is a score derived from standardized tests designed to assess 
intelligence. 
12According to Linstone (2008) the Rand Corporation is the most influential American think tank of the second 
half of the 20th century. The company was established in 1946 to deal with useful applications labeled 
“operations research”, which applied mathematics to problems such as interceptor vectoring and convoy 
protection.  Presently, Rand is well accepted in decision making corridors of Washington, DC, and offers vast 
research and analysis to the U.S. armed forces. Rand is currently financed by the U.S. government and private 
foundations, corporations including the healthcare industry, universities and private individuals. 
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communication interaction, well-being, participation level in social activities or engagement in the 
community and integration in the community. This new quantification trend should not be interpreted 
as a conspiracy against the culture of qualitative reasoning, as some argued in social sciences circles. 
In fact, the production of an indicator reflects values that existed in society before their creation of 
moral, ethical, political, economic or financial nature. In fact, their significant expansion in recent 
years was based on an existent societal will, expressed for example by many influential organizations 
(e.g. OECD, ILO, UNDP, WHO, universities, etc.). Today, even a qualitative analysis of a large 
research question has to include an attempt to quantify as much as possible parts of the question. In 
fact, the present work aims to present quantified data on the influence of indicators in specific 
decisions, to complement further qualitative analysis. 
2.3 Indicators in technology innovation decisions 
As mentioned earlier, indicators have been introduced in social debates for a long time, embedded in a 
culture of objectivity. They are considered to be a useful instrument to guide and improve our 
collective and personal decisions. While indicators are ostensibly present in our collective rhetoric and 
apparently impact our day-to-day lives, comparatively fewer studies have been carried out addressing 
the relevance of indicators in management, research and policy, particularly in the context of 
innovation processes. 
The extent to which indicators are used in decision making is largely unknown. Most literature aims to 
develop indicators, to analyze them or to evaluate them. Only a few authors have provided clues 
regarding the extent to which they are used to make a decision, and these qualitative studies were 
mostly restricted to policy making. In fact, Gudmundsson and Sørensen (2012) found evidences that 
indicators seem to play a very limited direct instrumental role in sustainable transport policy making.  
Furthermore, MacRae (1985) argued that the most frequent problem of indicators is their nonuse in 
policy making. The reasons for this disregard of indicators can be found in the lack of interest, 
information overload, lack of communication or even opposition to what is being measured .It seems, 
therefore, necessary to proceed in two directions: First, broaden the investigations to other areas of 
decision making to allow for comparisons with policy making. Second, determine the role of 
indicators in decision because no quantified information exists to provide an initial background for 
analysis. The study of indicators in technology innovation decisions will help characterize the social 
phenomena behind the technological innovation process. It will provide information about the main 
actors, indicators’ use and their real influence, the role of social context and the role the type of 
decisions have in the decision process. 
2.3.1 Use and influence in the decision 
There is the need to disentangle the use of indicators from their factual relevance in decision making, 
as suggested in the Gudmundsson and Sørensen (2012) study. In fact, determining the real influence of 
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indicators allows not only for an understanding of their importance in the decision process, but also to 
determine the dominant approach used in the decision. In turn, the investigation will provide clues on 
how knowledge is introduced in decisions and a deeper understanding of the social process of decision 
in technological innovation contexts.  
Unfortunately, questions about the effective influence of indicators were seldom the object of research. 
The seminal work of Gudmundsson and Sørensen (2012) revealed that the use of indicators does not 
automatically mean influence on policies or processes in sustainable transport policy. In their study, 
indicators played a very limited direct instrumental role in the decision processes. Generalization is 
difficult, however, particularly because sectorial conditions might change significantly from transport 
policy to, for example, pharmaceutical policy where a significant amount of quantified data and 
objective information exists and is accessible. Therefore, there is also the need to broaden the scope of 
these sectorial and policy related findings to other decision making processes.  
This work intends to contribute with findings providing evidences about the use and influence of 
indicators in the decision making process of knowledge-intensive innovation groups. It will be 
assumed that indicators are influential in technological innovation decisions of knowledge-intensive 
groups, because rationality-driven decisions are expected among those who participate in technology 
innovation without the least possible knowledge constraints. 
The influence of indicators in policy contexts were categorized by Gudmundsson and Sørensen (2012) 
in four groups: instrumental, conceptual, process and symbolic. The authors considered first that an 
instrumental role of an indicator means that it had direct influence and was used directly as a tool to 
form a decision. Second, a conceptual role reveals that indicators contributed to shape knowledge or 
introduce new ideas, but were neither immediately used nor influential in decisions. Third, a process 
role means that an indicator used over time affects the way some aspect of policy making is 
conducted, regardless of what the indicator tells/reveals directly. Fourth and last, a symbolic role 
means that an indicator was used to justify decisions that have already been taken, or to give a rational 
appearance to the decisions. According to the authors, this role may still embody policy influence in 
terms of policy legitimacy or in terms of the balance of power. 
However, these second and third categories present significant difficulties, probably because they were 
formulated to analyse a specific policy making case and not to examine technology innovation 
decisions. There are four main difficulties: First, there is significant difficulty in distinguishing 
conceptual from process role in two ways: (a) an indicator that contributes to shape knowledge or 
introduce new ideas (conceptual role), may also affect the way some aspects of how policy making is 
conducted (process role); (b) an indicator may be used over time (process role) and not used 
immediately nor be influential in decision (conceptual role). Second, a conceptual role probably does 
not exist in the practice of a technology decision maker. To her/him an indicator that contributed to 
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shape new knowledge and ideas produces inevitably changes the framework of decision,13 and 
consequently was influential in the decision. In other words, for a scientist, an engineer, a manager or 
a policy maker reflecting on the influence of an indicator in a technology decision, it is difficult to say 
that an indicator was not influential, if one admits it contributes to shape knowledge and introduce 
new ideas. Third, it is difficult to admit that an indicator influenced some aspect of the decision 
regardless of what it tells directly. Fourth and last, from the practical point of view, an indicator is an 
objective concept that is either present or not in a concrete technology decision. Indicators can hardly 
be a semi-part of a decision, through shaping knowledge or introducing new ideas used over time 
without being immediately used in a decision. Therefore, bearing these four difficulties in mind, it can 
be concluded that these two distinctions are not substantially interesting to technology innovation 
decisions. 
In this work, only an instrumental role and a symbolic role will be used to understand the influence 
indicators have in technology decisions. It will only be considered that indicators can either play (1) an 
instrumental role, (2) a symbolic role and (3) no role at all in technology innovation decisions: 
An instrumental role (1) means that indicators had direct influence and were used as a tool to make 
a technology decision. The instrumental influence of indicators in decision implies that a rational-
analytical method was used, such as evidence-based analysis or operational research. In addition, 
this indicators’ role also suggests that a rational-analytical approach was applied solo or 
predominantly complemented with a political-behavioural or an emotional-intuitive approach. 
A symbolic role (2) means that indicators were used to justify decisions after they have been taken 
or to give a rational appearance to decisions. The symbolic role implies that no rational-analytic 
method was used predominantly to decide. This role shows that the predominant decision approach 
was political-behavioural, either solo or predominantly in interaction with a rational-analytic or an 
emotional-intuitive approach. 
In this train of thought, it can be argued that quantification needs are mostly symbolic at policy 
level, where they can play a relative role. In fact, Perri 6 (2002) claimed that decision makers use a 
certain amount of knowledge when making a decision, and their judgments are dependent on where 
actors are socially situated and integrated. This view implies that the influence of indicators is 
determined by the social “cage” of the users, and that social relations act upon individuals 
constraining and guiding them both consciously and unconsciously in their decisions. However, the 
influence of these social relations can vary in different social groups, particularly in groups where 
the social “cage” can be less present, such as the researchers group. Therefore, to understand the 
role of indicators is necessary to inquire about the role of social relations in the decision. 
                                                   
13 Through for example the previously mentioned constitutive effects. 
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Last, indicators played no role at all in the decisions (3) are associated to situations where 
information does not exist, is incomplete or ambiguous to be analysed, or even the consequences of 
the decisions are significantly unpredictable. These conditions have been associated to predominant 
emotional-intuitive approaches, such as judgements or gut feeling (Jauch and Glueck 1988). The 
absence of indicators also reveals a lack of rational-analytic tools14 or quantified measures in the 
decision process. Therefore, the no role at all of indicators shows that an emotional-intuitive 
approach existed, either solo or in dominant interaction with a political-behavioural approach.  
It is important to consider that indicators used in technology decisions are very different from each 
other. The major difference can be found at the level of use in the innovation processes: First, policy 
makers make technology decisions that influence the innovation system mostly at the national level. 
For example, policy makers can use the indicator Business Enterprise Expenditure on R&D (million 
current PPP15$) to decide upon a policy to stimulate university-company R&D projects. Second, 
business R&D&I personnel make technology decisions of a different sort. The type of indicators this 
group tends to use are mostly (but not only16) related with the market or company, because their 
technology decisions tend to be connected to the development of new products or technologies. For 
example, their decision can use indicators related to innovation in a firm, such as the number of new 
products using their patented technology, or the costs of hiring a new researcher to develop a new 
technology. Third, (public) researchers, academics and R&D health personnel tend to make decisions 
also mostly at the product or technology level. For example, in a R&D project a researcher will focus 
on an indicator of the financial cost of a new DNA sequencer17 or microscope to enable her/his 
research. Therefore, the type of indicators used to make technology decisions during innovation 
processes can vary significantly and is primarily related with the type of decision.  
Within this diversity, however, linking indicators’ use to technology decisions can be useful for two 
reasons. First, indicators’ use, combined use or non-use detects their real influence in technology 
innovation decisions and uncovers other drivers or motivations such as the pressure of other groups. 
Second, the theoretical model previously suggested for technology decisions in innovation contexts 
can be tested by identifying the roles of indicators. An influential role of indicators in a decision 
reveals that a rational-analytic method was dominating the individual’s attention during the decision. 
A symbolic role of indicators (e.g. when social relations were considered more important than 
indicators) reveals that a political-behavioural method was dominating the decision. And an emotional 
                                                   
14(i) Rules of thumb - for example when the rule is if there is a 20% increase in profits we need to buy new 
technology; (ii) Evidence-based analysis – for example when making cost-benefit analysis, weighting options, 
etc.; and (iii) Operations research – using mathematical models to explore quantified evidences. All three 
methods require some sort of quantification, which would mean having an indicator of something. 
15 Purchasing Power Parities (national currency per dollar). 
 
17 A Deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) sequencer is a scientific instrument used to automate the DNA sequencing 
process. A sequencer is used to automatically determine the order of the DNA’s four constituents: adenine, 
guanine, cytosine, and thymine. 
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approach was used when indicators were not used at all and social relations were not significantly 
relevant. 
2.3.2 Types of technology innovation decisions 
There are four types of technology decisions that can occur in innovation processes. In fact, in 
innovation contexts there can be, first, decisions about the acquisition of new equipment and/or 
technology. Second, innovations can also occur after decisions about the development of a new 
product and/or a technology. Third, innovations also can be the outcome of decisions about acquisition 
of intellectual property, which can involve buying patents, trademarks, industrial designs, 
geographical indications or copyrights. Fourth and last, there can be decisions about the design of 
policies which can produce effects in the innovation system and, consequently, in technology 
innovation. 
Any decision is expected to contain elements of complexity and uncertainty. These two factors are 
central to technological innovation because: First, technological innovation is often associated with 
complexity18 (Chapman and Hyland 2004; Rycroft 2007; Waelbroeck 2003; Wonglimpiyarat 2005). In 
the technology innovation context, complexity can be understood as components that integrated 
together cause difficulties in the transformation into successful products/processes (Wonglimpiyarat 
2005). Complexity in innovation has been associated with experiences where information is 
incomplete, ambiguous and the consequences of actions are highly unpredictable (Aram and Noble 
1999). In these contexts, complexity is contained in technologies, products, customer interfaces and 
organizational setups (Chapman and Hyland 2004). Second, technological innovation is also often 
associated with uncertainty (Böhle 2011; Jalonen and Lehtonen 2011; Fusari and Reati 2013; Meijer, 
Hekkert, and Koppenjan 2007; Dosi 1982; Nelson and Winter 1977; Carbonell and Rodríguez-
Escudero 2009; Sainio, Ritala, and Hurmelinna-Laukkanen 2012). Uncertainty can be defined as the 
degree to which a number of alternatives are perceived with respect to the occurrence of an event and 
the relative probabilities of these alternatives (Rogers 2003). Innovation involves uncertainty in an 
essential way because “different people, and different organizations, will disagree as to where to place 
their R&D chips, and on when to make their bets” (Nelson and Winter 1977, 47). There are numerous 
types of uncertainty associated to the innovation processes although technological, market and 
regulatory uncertainties have an established status (Jalonen and Lehtonen 2011; Sainio, Ritala, and 
Hurmelinna-Laukkanen 2012).19 It can be concluded that uncertainty is a central element of the 
technology innovation decisions. 
                                                   
18 According to the Oxford Dictionaries Online (2014) complexity means the state or quality of being intricate or 
complicated. 
19 But many more can be identified. For example, Carbonell and Rodríguez-Escudero (2009) considered only 
two aspects of uncertainty: technology novelty and technological turbulence. In their study of innovation on 
biomass gasification projects in the Netherlands, Meijer, Hekkert, and Koppenjan (2007) reported that 
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Each type of decision presents different complexity and uncertainty levels. First, decisions about the 
acquisition of equipment/technology are less complex when compared with the three following types 
of decisions, because they involve primarily comparisons between products/technologies and 
immediate assessments of impacts in a technology innovation processes. Furthermore, the level of 
uncertainty associated with this type of decision is also rather low, since most buyers know what to 
expect from the acquisition of an equipment/technology. Second, decisions about the development of a 
product/technology are a complex when compared to the other types of technology innovation 
decisions (Chapman and Hyland 2004). They are often a complex strategic decision that require not 
only a decision about the product/technology that should be developed and why, but also knowledge 
on how to pursue with the development phase. Furthermore, this type of decision frequently involves a 
significant level of uncertainty mostly because there is no guarantee of success (Böhle 2011). In fact, a 
product or technology development occurs in contexts of changing circumstances that may render a 
technology less attractive or even obsolete, and where technological promises may never materialise 
(Kemp et al. 1998). Third, decisions about the acquisition of intellectual property rights are simpler 
and less uncertain when compared to the other three types of technology decisions. Although they may 
involve some strategic thinking, they are often based on the acquisition of knowledge about a 
workable solution to a problem, a product or a technology through an industrial patent, for example. 
Furthermore, the acquisition of propriety rights often carries less uncertainty than the development of 
a product/technology. In fact, the technological concept is already proven and accepted by patent 
offices, although the decision still carries the risks that a technology may become less attractive or 
obsolete and that the expectations may not materialize (Kemp et al. 1998), for example. Fourth and 
last, decisions about policy design are significantly complex and uncertain, because they involve 
concerns with the social and economic impact in a complex and uncertain target: the innovation 
system (see Smits, Merkerk, and Guston 2010; Kuhlmann, Shapira, and Smits 2010).  
The use of indicators is negatively associated with complexity and uncertainty. Higher levels of 
complexity and uncertainty are expected to demand lower dependence on indicators. In fact, 
individuals facing the absence or ambiguous information tend to decide based on their experience, 
emotions and/or intuition rather than use rational-analytical approaches, as discussed earlier. Although 
uncertainty might motivate an individual to seek information, the “information about innovation is 
often sought from near-peers, especially information about their subjective evaluations of the 
innovation” (Rogers 2003, p.xix). To Rogers (2003), this information exchange about a new idea 
occurs through a convergence process involving interpersonal networks.  
Each type of decisions requires different needs of indicators. First, decisions about acquisition of 
equipment/technology (comparatively low on complexity and uncertainty) are expected to involve 
considerations very dependent on specific indicators, such as financial costs (acquisition, maintenance, 
                                                                                                                                                               
technological, political and resource uncertainty are the most dominant sources of perceived uncertainty 
influencing entrepreneurial decision-making. 
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etc.) and technical characteristics of the product/technology. Second, decisions concerning the 
development of product/technology (comparatively high on complexity and uncertainty) are expected 
to be significantly independent from a broad type of indicators spread between costs, time, human 
resources, infrastructure, consumers’ trends, market growth, sustainability impacts, etc. Third, 
decisions about intellectual property (comparatively low on complexity and high on uncertainty) are 
expected to be independent from less indicators than the previous type of decision, such as costs, time, 
consumers’ trends, market growth, sustainability impacts, etc. Fourth, decisions related to policy 
design are expected to induce a significant independency from a broad range of indicators, such as 
patents applications, employment in knowledge-intensive activities, R&D expenditures, education 
levels of the workforce, etc. 
The following table summarizes the relationship between types of technologies, complexity and 
uncertainty and use of indicators. 
Table 1 – Relationship between types of technologies, complexity, uncertainty and use of indicators 
Needs
-- -- ++
+ + -
- + +
++ ++ --Policy design
Complexity Uncertainty
Financial costs (acquisition, maintenance, 
etc.) and technical characteristics of the 
product/technology
Costs, time, human resources, infrastructure, 
consumers’ trends, market growth, 
sustainability impacts, etc
Costs, time, consumers’ trends, market 
growth, sustainability impacts, etc
Patents applications, employment in 
knowledge-intensive activities, R&D 
expenditures, education levels of the 
Examples
Indicators
Acquistion of equipment/technology
Development of products/technology
Acquistion of intellectual property rights
 
Note: -- Very low; - Low; + High and ++ Very high. 
The table reveals that the types of technology decisions are relevant to understand the role of 
indicators in technology innovation decisions. In fact, each type tends to require different needs for 
indicators. A decision about acquisition of equipment/technology is expected to have a very high need 
for a few indicators.  A decision to develop of a product/technology suggests a low need from a broad 
type of indicators. A decision about the acquisition of intellectual property rights, however, may have 
a higher need of a reduced list of indicators than the previous one. And last, policy design suggests a 
very high need of a broad range of indicators. 
In summary, there are four types of technology decisions that can occur in innovation processes: 
acquisition of new equipment and/or technology, development of a new product and/or a technology, 
acquisition of intellectual property, and policy design. Any decision is expected to contain different 
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elements of complexity and uncertainty. The use of indicators is negatively associated with complexity 
and uncertainty. Therefore, each type of decisions requires different needs of indicators. 
To conclude, decision making processes are complex phenomena where several influences can occur. 
Decision processes depend not only of contextual influences but also from factors associated with the 
type of decision. A quantitative study of the role of indicators in decisions of technology innovation 
can help bridging the gap in knowledge about indicators’ presence in decision making. The work 
needs to distinguish between use from real influence, to detect other influences and to identify the 
types of technology decision involved. 
3. Methodology 
This research focuses on the initial technology decision which takes place after an idea occurs and the 
preliminary analysis of its benefits is carried out. This analysis can contain elements of political, 
knowledge or competitiveness reasoning, before a decision on how to proceed occurs. The focus on 
the initial decision can help understanding on how decisions are made in technology innovation 
processes. The term technology decision here relates to a decision related to technology made in the 
initial phase of an innovation processes, such as: (1) a decision to acquire equipment or a specific 
technology; (2) a decision to develop a product or a specific technology; (3) a decision to buy property 
rights; or (4) a decision related to the design of technology policies (programs, measures, actions, 
projects, etc.). These types of decisions can occur across all sectors, company or research centres sizes, 
levels in organizations, different cultures, etc.  
The research undertaken in this work targets the three groups in an innovation system: 
1. Researchers: a group composed of public researchers, academics, and R&D health personnel, 
hereafter named researchers; 
2. Business Research, Development and Innovation (R&D&I) personnel: a group composed by team 
leaders of R&D&I departments in companies20, hereafter named business; and 
3. Policy makers related to technology innovation: a group involved in technology decisions and the 
design of strategies that address the innovation system (Kuhlmann, Shapira, and Smits 2010).  
There are both common and specific reasons to target these three groups. The groups were commonly 
selected because: First, the groups are composed by individuals who (i) reported technology decisions 
recently (e.g. acquisition of equipment, development of products/technology, expenses for intellectual 
property or were involved in the design of innovation-related policies); (ii) have access to and use vast 
amounts of techno-scientific knowledge; (iii) normally have contact with indicators; and (iv) possess 
                                                   
20In order to simplify the presentation of the data, researchers group will be briefly denominated as researchers, 
and the group of business R&D&I personnel is briefly denominated “business” or “companies”. 
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skills to deal with indicators. Second, the way these individuals use indicators captures the extent to 
which knowledge of facts were searched in order to decide. It also reveals to what extent this type of 
knowledge is applied in practical terms to make decisions. Therefore, research on the use of indicators 
in their decisions can contribute to the understanding of decision making and of knowledge 
management in innovation contexts. Third, these groups are closely linked with the innovation system 
and play important roles in its functioning. All of them deal with the production, management or 
dissemination of innovation. It is expected that this line of research could contribute to the 
understanding of interactions between technology innovation and society.  
Furthermore, these three groups were individually targeted because: 
1) Researchers can influence technology developments in different ways. First, they are involved in 
R&D projects that can lead to new technologies and innovations. Second, the group is involved 
with students before they reach decisive positions, and influence other researchers and other 
communities on possible technology options. Third, these individuals are frequently called to 
decide upon significant investments that influence directly or indirectly technology options, such 
as research programs and projects, setting up new laboratories, universities, hospitals, clinics and 
other specialized institutes, acquire powerful microscopes and diagnosis machines, etc. Fourth and 
last, this group informs and helps decision makers on technology choices. For example, they can 
assist in important public and private choices, such as the development of satellites, transport 
systems, other research-related facilities, the acquisition of submarines, supercomputers, 
helicopters and airplanes, the construction of highways, bridges and dams, etc. 
2) Business R&D&I leaders are responsible for most choices regarding the development of new 
products or new technologies, and are frequently in charge of important strategic decisions inside 
the most innovative companies. In fact, they are most frequently found leading innovation 
departments of firms or in charge of R&D projects.  
3) Policy makers related to technology innovation are involved in technology decisions and the 
design of strategies that address the innovation system (Kuhlmann, Shapira, and Smits 2010). 
Their policies can involve programs, projects, ideas, legislation and other regulatory frameworks 
that affect the development of technology innovations. These policy makers deal with policies and 
legislation designed, for example, to promote Science & Technology (S&T) graduates, support 
patenting efforts, backing export-oriented companies, etc.  
Various methodologies were applied to ascertain the influence of indicators in technology innovation. 
As mentioned previously, the initial work combined literature research, analysis of official documents 
and (a) exploratory interviews. Afterwards, the work included (b) the design and deployment of three 
closed online questionnaires, which is the focus of the present work. The questionnaires were 
complemented with (c) seventeen semi-structured interviews. In addition, the work included (d) eight 
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in-depth interviews with experts conducted after the surveys (In this paper the interviews will be used 
only to contextualize quantified data). In closer details: 
(a) The exploratory interviews were designed to prepare and calibrate the questionnaires and 
subsequent interviews. Twelve experts with sound knowledge and experience on the use of 
indicators and decision making were interviewed in Germany, Switzerland and Portugal, between 
October 2011 and January 2012.  
(b) The questionnaires addressed Portuguese representatives of the three groups under analysis, 
collecting ninety one valid answers from February 2012 to June 2013. The samples were 
composed only by individuals who were involved in consistent technology decisions and belonged 
to the mentioned groups. The samples were created using non-probability sampling methods 
(Saumure and Given 2008) in the following way: 
- The business R&D&I and the researchers’ samples were selected using a purposive method - 
Criterion sampling (see Palys 2008) based on the 2010 National R&D Survey.21 The criteria 
used required the existence of (1) scientific leaders of a R&D project in 2010 with significant 
expenditures in equipment (i.e. an expenditure with instruments, equipment or software equal 
or higher than 3000€ for researchers and 1500€ for business R&D&I personnel group), and to 
have (2) at least one PhD in the research team (Full-time equivalent). In this way, the criteria 
confirmed not only that a consistent technology decision was made in an concrete innovation 
context, but also that the research team had proper skills to conduct a sound R&D project. 
Therefore, the samples were significantly representative because they were only composed by 
scientists (or equivalents) who took a consistent technology decision in a reliable R&D 
environment. In this context, there were 57 leaders of R&D&I departments in companies in 
the National R&D Survey database, and 36 responses were received corresponding to a 
response rate of 63%.22 There were 78 researchers that met the criteria, and 31 responses were 
received corresponding to a response rate of 40%. 
- The sample of policy makers was created using snowball sampling (Morgan 2008), because 
there was no other sources to locate the members of this population and almost all members of 
knew each other. The initial set of research participants (serving as informants about potential 
participants) was significantly diverse, and was complemented with Google searches to avoid 
any possible bias. Two successive waves of snowballing assured a more representative sample 
(Schutt 2008). The final sample was composed by the vast majority of individuals directly 
                                                   
21The National R&D Survey (named IPCTN) is a reliable long-term survey that captures in detail data about any 
existing R&D projects, researchers and companies involved in R&D in Portugal. The survey has also 
internationally comparable standards, is based on the Frascati Manual and is regularly checked by OECD, 
Eurostat and the National Institute of Statistics. 
22The 2010 national R&D survey database detected 59 companies in the country that met the criteria. The 
business questionnaire was sent, however, only to 57 due to the closer of 2 firms. 
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involved in innovation policy decisions in the period 2005-2011 in the country. The sample 
can be considered significantly representative, particularly given the reduced number of 
individuals involved in innovation policy at the time. In this context, there were 59 individuals 
listed as being involved in consistent technology decisions regarding innovation policy. 
Exactly 24 responses were received, which corresponds to a response rate of 41%.23 
The response rates obtained for the three groups were considered significant for normal standards 
in social research, where they are traditionally lower (see Shih and Fan 2009; Baruch 1999). 
Furthermore, to account for effects on response rates (see Sauermann and Roach 2013; Fan and 
Yan 2010), there were three personalized email campaigns with three reminders each and personal 
contacts to sensitize individuals to answer, from February 2012 to mid-June 2013. The answers 
were not compulsory by law, there were no economic incentives to answer and the questionnaires 
were not part of the national statistical system. Only volunteers could reply to the questionnaires 
given the scientific nature of the surveys. In addition, the online answers did not allow establishing 
any relationship with specific individual technology decisions. Finally, the questionnaires were 
short (on average five minutes), identical (see bellow), with closed questions (with two exceptions 
for the policy makers group – see below) and always related to concrete technology options.  
The three questionnaires were similar. The difference between the questionnaires to researchers 
and business R&D&I group was small, and consisted in small adaptations of the text to the context 
of each innovation group. However, as mentioned before, there were two distinct features in the 
case of policy makers. These features were based on the need to assist in the assessment of the 
degree of use of indicators in the decision of policy makers. First, a pre-question was introduced to 
identify the position occupied during the technology policy decision. The options were Minister, 
Secretary of State, Political advisor to the Minister, Political advisor to the Secretary of State, 
Consultant; Director-General, Civil servant, Parliamentarian, City Mayor and Other position. 
Second, three questions were added to understand the level of knowledge about the indicators used 
in the policy decision: (i) “Please name the indicators used or recommended to make the 
decision”; (ii) “Did you use other type of information in the decision (e.g. studies, advices or 
sectorial information)?”; and (iii) “In case you used other type of information, please name 
indicators that were used”. All responses to the questionnaires were collected anonymously, with 
the exceptions of those that resulted from direct interviews. No significant differences were 
detected between online replies and direct answers.  
(c) The twenty six semi-structured interviews were conducted to complement the data in the 
questionnaires. The majority of the interviews (13 interviews or 50%) targeted the policy makers, 
followed by researchers (7 interviews or 27%) and the business community (6 interviews or 23%). 
                                                   
23The two sampling technics allowed the identification of 65 policy makers but, after a significant number of 
attempts to locate the policy makers, 6 were considerable unreachable. 
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The emphasis on interviews to policy makers was justified by the sensitive nature of the 
information requested, and to avoid any suspicion of misuse of information. All interviews to the 
three groups were conducted using one guiding questionnaire, in a confidential way and lasted on 
average one hour. The use of the questionnaires as a tool to guide the interviews was a practical 
way to have similar answers across the three groups, to focus the interview on the critical 
questions, and to allow new questions arising during the conversation. In this paper the interviews 
will be used only to help contextualize quantified data. 
(d) Last, the work also included four in-depth interviews to answer remaining questions with experts 
conducted after the surveys, during April 2012 to June 2013 in Portugal and Germany. 
As mentioned previously, there were no records of quantitative research applied to the use and 
influence of indicators in the technology innovation literature. Therefore, research presented here 
focused on the quantification of the major characteristics of the use of influence of indicators by 
surveying only individuals directly involved in technology innovation. These efforts allowed the 
establishment of the initial background necessary to understand indicators’ reach (and rational-
analytical decision making) in the context of technology innovation. Although beyond the scope of 
this paper, further qualitative research will complement the quantified results presented in the next 
section. 
4. Results 
This part presents results from a survey designed to understand the role of indicators in decisions of 
technology innovation. The quantification of their use and influence will establish the initial 
background of information necessary to understand indicators’ presence in technology innovation 
decisions. The work presented here constitutes a preliminary quantitative assessment necessary to 
further qualitative endeavours on the role of indicators in technology innovation decision. It will allow 
a deeper understanding of the extent to which indicators are present among those who can use 
indicators as freely as possible in technology innovation. It will also help understand the main type of 
thinking dominating the attention of these knowledge-intensive innovation groups during decisions.  
The following sub-chapters present results related to questions of the questionnaires above-mentioned. 
The first part addresses the use and influence of indicators in decision making, describing their 
presence in each group as an instrument of decision, and the weight or the real influence indicators 
have in the final decision. This distinction between the use and influence is relevant because it reveals 
the presence of indicators in the decision, and it shows their real contribution to the decision. After, it 
will allow categorizing indicators’ roles and it will help to detect the prominence of decision 
approaches. The second part refers to the context of the decision, by identifying the main external 
sources of influence in these decisions. As this question came first in the questionnaire than the 
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former, it enabled the participant to first reflect on the individuals who influenced the final decision, 
and afterwards reflect on what was more important: the indicators or the groups previously identified. 
The third and last part deals with the influence of the types of technology decisions in the use of 
indicators. As previously mentioned, the types of technology decisions are considered relevant to 
understand the need for indicators involved in a decision. 
4.1 Use and influence of indicators 
The first question of the questionnaires was directly related to the use of indicators during a significant 
technology decision. The following table summarizes the answers and percentages obtained for the 
question. 
Table 2 – Number and percentage of answers to the question “Did you use indicators during technology 
decision?” by group 
 
Answers % Answers % Answers %
Researchers 22 71% 9 29% 31 100%
Business R&D&I 32 89% 4 11% 36 100%
Policy makers 22 92% 2 8% 24 100%
All groups 76 84% 15 16% 91 100%
Yes No Total
 
The table reveals a majority pattern of use of indicators among those who were invited to reflect on the 
use of indicators during their technology decision-making process. In fact, the vast majority (84%) of 
all answers revealed that they used indicators during their technology decisions. Only 16% of the 
respondents said that they did not use them. Although groups taken together present a defined pattern, 
a closer look into the three groups under observation revealed minor differences that worth analysis: 
First, the policy makers presented the most polarised pattern, in which 96% answered that they used 
indicators in their decisions, and only 4% stated that they did not use them. Second, 89% of the 
business R&D&I personnel answered that they used indicators to decide, and 11% indicated that they 
did not use them in the technology decision process. Third, there was a less intensive polarization in 
the group of researchers. In fact, a less polarized but still vast majority (71%) of researchers answered 
that they used indicators during their technology decision. Accordingly, a higher but still minority 
percentage of answers (29%) stated that they did not use indicators to decide. Therefore, it can be said 
that the intensity in the use of indicators in technology decisions is high although differentiated in each 
group. 
In sum, the significant use of indicators detected in the results supports the view that these groups use 
indicators as an instrument to make technology decisions. These results suggest that this intensive use 
of indicators translates the quest to use knowledge during the decision-making process. However, the 
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use of indicators should hypothetically mean that they were influential in the decision. The following 
question addresses the influence of indicators. 
The  next question referred to whether indicators were more important than social relations during the 
technology innovation decision. The next table summarizes in percentages the responses obtained by 
group.  
Table 3 – Number and percentage of answers to the question “Do you think that indicators were more influential 
than social relations during the technology decision?” by group 
 
Answers % Answers % Answers %
Researchers 11 50% 11 50% 22 100%
Business R&D&I 13 41% 19 59% 32 100%
Policy makers 7 32% 15 68% 22 100%
All groups 31 41% 45 59% 76 100%
Yes No Total
 
The table reveals that social relations were more important than indicators to the majority (59%) of 
respondents. In more detail, the majority of both policy makers and the business group (68% and 59%, 
respectively) answered that the social relations were more important than the use of indicators. 
However, researchers answers were even (50%), stating the indicators were as important as social 
relations in their technology decision process. 
Interestingly, a comparison between table 1 and table 2 reveals that the more indicators are claimed to 
be used, the less influential they are in technology innovation decisions because comparatively: (a) 
policy makers used more indicators (92%), but considered indicators less relevant than social relations 
(68%); (b) business R&D&I leaders used slightly less indicators (89%), but considered them slightly 
more relevantly although less important than social relations (59%); and last (c) researchers used 
comparatively lesser indicators (71%) but considered them as influential as social relations (50%). 
Therefore, the disentanglement of use and influence of indicators allowed a concrete identification of 
the real and different weight indicators carry in the decisions of each group. 
The relative significance of indicators among researchers suggests that social activities of researchers 
are less relevant to the decision. Several reasons may account for that, such as researchers’ work tends 
to be (a) comparatively more autonomous (less dependent of their social context) and (b) more 
involved in the search for factual objective knowledge to reach scientific conclusions (an activity 
closely connected with the use of indicators). Contrastingly, business individuals can be more 
dependent on company hierarchies and market considerations to make a technology innovation 
decision; and policy makers are relatively more bounded by their social activities and in significant 
need for expertise (i.e. for indicators as source of knowledge) to be able to decide. The next sub-
chapter will present results to clarify these issues. 
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These results allow for the categorization of the roles of indicators in the decisions, described in 
chapter 2. The following table presents results related to the role of indicators in technology decision 
by groups.  
Table 4 - The influence of indicators in technology decisions by group 
Answers % Answers % Answers % Answers %
Researchers 11 35% 11 35% 9 29% 31 100%
Business R&D&I 13 36% 19 53% 4 11% 36 100%
Policy makers 7 29% 15 63% 2 8% 24 100%
All groups 31 34% 45 49% 15 16% 91 100%
Instrumental Symbolic No role Total
 
The table reveals that indicators were instrumental to circa one third of the decisions in the groups (i.e. 
[29%-36%]). It also shows that indicators played mostly a symbolic role in decisions particularly in 
the policy makers and the business R&D&I groups (63% and 53%, respectively). Results for 
researchers were distributed more evenly between instrumental and symbolic (each 35%). Only a few 
indicated that indicators had no use in the technology decision, although the percentage was higher 
(29%) in the case of researchers. 
In sum, results suggest that indicators had a symbolic influence mainly among policy makers as 
predicted in the literature. Business R&D&I leaders revealed a similar profile, although less 
emphatically. Researchers used indicators more heterogeneously. 
4.2 Influence of the context 
As mentioned previously, the social context is expected to influence the role of indicators in 
technology innovation decision. The next question intended to identify the most important 
individuals/groups to the decision. The following table presents results related to the most important 
influence in the decision,24 a question were respondents had to classify the intensity of the influence in 
a four-point Likert scale to force a choice identifying the most important influence in the decision. 
Table 5 – The most important influence of individuals/groups in technology decisions by group 
                                                   
24Only results related to “Very important” classification are shown in the table. 
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Answers % Answers % Answers % Answers %
7 23% 25 69% 15 63% 47 52%
5 16% 4 11% 4 17% 13 14%
16 52% 11 31% 7 29% 34 37%
11 35% 9 25% 3 13% 23 25%
4 13% 2 6% 3 13% 9 10%
13 42% 14 39% 4 17% 31 34%
0 0% 3 8% 0 0% 3 3%
4 13% 4 11% 4 17% 12 13%
13 42% 4 11% 3 13% 20 22%
0 0% 2 6% 3 13% 5 5%
4 13% 15 42% 4 17% 23 25%
1 3% 1 3% 3 13% 5 5%
2 6% 0 0% 2 8% 4 4%
1 3% 0 0% 1 4% 2 2%
0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Technology users
Salesmen/Account managers/Consultants
Business / Industrial groups
Researchers / Academics
Researchers Business R&D&I Policy makers Total
Financial directors and accounters
Experts
Colleagues
Personal relationships (acquaintances, friends, etc.)
Politicians / Management / Managers
Media
Groups of citizens (associations, pressure groups, etc.)
Society in general
Other political decisors
Consumers
Other  
The table reveals different influences for each group. First, researchers indicated that experts were 
their most important influence in their technology decision (52%), followed by technology users and 
researchers/academics (ex aequo 42%). These responses point to the primacy of knowledge sources 
and users as the main influence in the decisions of this group. Second, the business R&D&I leaders 
indicated that management/managers (69%) were their most important influence, followed by 
consumers (42%). These answers suggest that hierarchies and users were the main influence in this 
group. Third, policy makers indicated that politicians (63%) and, to a lesser extent, experts (29%) as 
the most important influences (perhaps explaining a need for expertise). These answers suggest that 
particularly hierarchies and also knowledge sources were the main influences in this group. The 
following figure summarizes these results aggregating the type of influences during technology 
decisions. 
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Figure 2 – The most relevant types of influences in technology decisions by group 
The figure reveals that the groups are mostly influenced by hierarchies, knowledge sources and users 
along three different lines: First, the hierarchies were the most relevant influence in the decisions of 
business R&D&I leaders and policy makers. In fact, these two groups declared liable politicians, 
management and managers to be the most relevant influence in their technology decisions (1st 
choices). Second, knowledge sources were also a significant influence in the decisions. Researchers 
indicated that experts and researchers/academics being the most influential to their decisions. Policy 
makers answered that experts were influential (2nd choice). Third, users of technology were also a 
significant type of influence in these decisions. Both researchers and business R&D&I leaders 
indicated users as a relevant influence in their decisions (ex aequo 2nd choice). 
In sum, results suggest that the most important influences in technology innovation decisions came 
from hierarchies, knowledge sources and users of technology, although in different combination for 
each group: (1) The links to hierarchies were emphasized by policy makers and by business R&D&I 
leaders; (2) The links to knowledge were relevant to researchers and, to a lesser extend, policy makers; 
(3) The links to users were relevant to researchers and business R&D&I leaders. These three patterns 
suggest that there are common influences among the three groups. It might be that these common 
influences derive also from the type of technology decision. The following sub-chapter will deal with 
this issue. 
4.3 Influence of the types of technology decisions 
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The type of technology decision can influence the way a decision is made. In fact, the need for 
indicators is expected to vary according to the type of technology decision along the lines previously 
described. The following table presents results of use of indicators by type of decision. 
Table 6 – Number and percentage of answers in relation to the use of indicators by type of technology decision 
Answers % Answers % Answers %
31 79% 8 21% 39 100%
24 83% 5 17% 29 100%
1 50% 1 50% 2 100%
20 95% 1 5% 21 100%
76 84% 15 16% 91 100%
Buying equipment/technology
Development of products/technology
Intellectual property rights
Total
Policy design
TotalNoYes
 
The table reveals that different types of technology decision require different uses of indicators. In 
fact, 79% of those buying equipment /technology reported use of indicators, followed by 83% who 
decided to develop products/technology and 95% of those who were involved in policy design. The 
number of responses for intellectual property rights is very low to allow analysis. Nevertheless, results 
suggest that the type of technology decision influences the use of indicators, as suggested in chapter 2.  
Furthermore, it was suggested in chapter 2 that the main drivers for different needs to use indicators 
were related to the complexity and uncertainty associated to the decision. There is a close association 
between the types of technology decisions in each group suggesting that these drivers are relevant, 
although a definitive answer requires further qualitative results out of the scope of this work. The 
following table summarizes the types of decisions identified by group in the questionnaire. 
Table 7 – Number and percentage of answers to the question “What type of decision did you make in relation to 
the adoption and/or investment in technology (choose the most relevant one to your actual or past 
activity)” by group 
Answers % Answers % Answers % Answers % Answers %
Researchers 27 87% 3 10% 1 3% 0 0% 31 100%
Business R&D&I 10 28% 25 69% 1 3% 0 0% 36 100%
Policy makers 2 8% 1 4% 0 0% 21 88% 24 100%
All groups 39 43% 29 32% 2 2% 21 23% 91 100%
Policy design
Aquisition of equipment 
/technology
Development of 
products/technology
Property rights Total
 
The table reveals that indicators were used to decide mostly about the same type of technology 
decisions. The vast majority of the researchers group (87%) decided about buying 
equipment/technology. The majority of the business R&D&I personnel (69%) decided about the 
development of products/technology. As expected, the vast majority of policy makers (88%) decided 
about policy design. Very few decided about intellectual property rights, and no other types of 
technology decisions were detected in the questionnaires. Therefore, it can be stated that the use of 
indicators are concentrated around specific types of technology decisions.  
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In sum, the types of technology impact on the need for indicators for three main reasons: First, results 
suggest that some types of decision need more indicators than others: Policy design requires more 
indicators than development of product/technology and, to a larger extend, than acquisition of 
equipment/technology. Second, each group tends to make the same type of relevant technology 
decision. Consequently, each group tends to have different needs of indicators: policy makers tend to 
need more indicators than business R&D&I leaders and even more than researchers (who tend to be 
the group who needs fewer indicators). Third, results for types of technology match the results of uses 
of indicators presented in the first question, where policy makers revealed to use more indicators than 
business and even more than researchers. Therefore, it can be concluded that the type of technology 
decisions is a significant factor affecting the use of indicators in decisions. 
4.4 Conclusions 
The initial assumption that innovation groups use indicators to make technology decisions was 
confirmed. However, corresponding expectations about the influence in the decision were not 
confirmed for three main reasons: First, the majority of policy makers and business R&D&I leaders 
considered indicators as mostly symbolic in the decision. Second, social relations were considered 
more important than indicators during the technology decisions of policy makers and business groups. 
These two groups were differently influenced by hierarchies, knowledge sources and users. Third, the 
role of indicators was also dependent of different types of technology decisions, and these claimed to 
use more but be less influence by indicators. Therefore, it can be said that indicators play a less 
influential role than initially thought. 
Two different profiles of decision were identified suggesting that the influence of indicators appears to 
be contingent in different degrees to, at least, the social world and the type of decision. On one hand, 
the researchers group used indicators in a more influential way, were less bounded by social relations, 
revealed abundant relationships with knowledge sources and users, and decided about acquisition of 
equipment/technology. On the other hand, business and policy makers were relatively more bounded 
to social relations (in increasing degrees) and admitted different influences: the business R&D&I 
group reported a moderate but influential role of social relations with influences of hierarchies and 
users in their decisions majorly about development of products/technology; and policy makers 
reported significant bounds to social relations with influences from hierarchy and knowledge sources 
in decisions about the design of policies.  
The quantification of the use and influence of indicators was important for two reasons: First, it 
provided an initial contextualization of the extent to which indicators can be used in decisions, by 
characterizing the decision pattern of those individuals who are most prone to use indicators: 
knowledge-intensive individuals involved  in technology innovation. Second, research also allowed 
the detection of three predominant approaches dominating the individual’s attention during the 
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decisions: (1) a rational-analytical approach in the case of instrumental role of indicators, where 
indicators were used and were also more important than social relations; (2) a political-behavioural 
approach in case of symbolic role of indicators, where indicators were used but social relations were 
classified as more important than indicators; and (3) the emotional-intuitive approach in case of no 
role at all to indicators, where respondents denied using indicators and revealed none or a minor 
influence of social relations.25 Present results showed that; First, researchers decisions were more 
based on rational-analytic approach when compared to the other groups (e.g. through stronger 
influence of indicators). This suggests that their work depend less of social interactions than the other 
groups perhaps influenced by engaging mostly in simpler acquisitions of equipment/technology.  
Second, business R&D&I group moderately emphasized a political-behavioural approach, not only 
because of their engagement in development of products/technology where success depends more on 
social factors such the need to interact with company hierarchies and users. Last, policy makers 
significantly emphasized a political-behavioural approach because their decisions in policy design 
need strong stakeholders engagement and expertise to decide, both significantly dependent of complex 
negotiation and consensus activities. 
5. Discussion 
Indicators are one tool among others to help technology innovation decisions. In fact, the relative 
minority of instrumental roles of indicators found in decisions suggest that indicators are mostly a 
complementary instrument of decision. When used relevantly, indicators can offer support to decide, 
help to confirm a decision or be used as instruments to justify decisions. But there are other significant 
influences in the decisions such as social relations, the type of decisions or even personal experiences 
to be taken into account. 
The different decision profiles identified previously allow for two different lines of discussion: First, 
the emphasis on the symbolic role of indicators in the business and policy makers communities 
appears to suggest that they mostly deliberate bounded by specific contexts, when contrasted with the 
group of researchers. One possible context is that decisions are taken under the significant complexity 
and uncertainty of the development of products/technology and policy decisions, vis-à-vis the research 
projects of scientists expected to deliver relatively more predictable outputs like papers and books. In 
fact, company and policy decisions of specific types of technology tend to face complexity and 
uncertainty from several sources, such as the volatile future of technology markets, job insecurity, the 
complexity of the innovation systems, etc. Therefore, decisions taken under these conditions may help 
explain a larger dependence on social ties and the weaker influence of rational-analytical methods 
found in the results. 
                                                   
25The results presented here include adjustments made after analysis of another question related to the styles of 
decision making and not presented here.  
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Second, researchers’ decision profile inspires a different line of discussion. In fact, differently from the 
other two groups, the answers from researchers suggest that at least their technology innovation 
decisions tend to be more rational/analytical and perhaps more efficiency-oriented. This difference 
might be attributed to their relatively more isolated social context and type of decisions (e.g. mostly 
acquisition of products/technology). However, the relative attachment to social relations revealed by 
business and policy makers groups does not necessarily imply a connection to kinship and lineage 
behaviours or to less efficiency-based decisions. In fact, the attachment to social relations might only 
reveal needs of dependence, consultation and/or consensus to be able to make reflexive judgments 
under uncertain conditions. 
Last, it is important to consider that present quantitative findings can be bound to the Portuguese 
realm, particularly among policy makers where different social and contextual settings might influence 
the behaviour of actors when dealing with indicators. Furthermore, comparability with other groups 
outside innovation might help to understand the uncertainty context under which technology 
innovation appears to happen in some groups. Consequently, further qualitative research should be 
conducted to complement the quantitative results presented in this work and to analyse remaining 
questions. 
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